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HARDY AND ELIOT: 
THE EYE OF NARCISSUS' LOOKING-GLASS 
by Nicola Harris 
'And by his own eyes he was undone.'! 
Hardy was both surprised and offended by the comparisons made between Far from the 
Madding Crowd (1874) and the novels of George Eliot; indeed, several critics went so far as 
to ascribe this new work to the acknowledged master in a complimentary manner but this 
failed to placate the aspiring newcomer. But most galling of all was the response it elicited 
from Henry James. From the very beginning, James took exception to the formal technique 
adopted by the writer who would become his greatest rival. He offered the most acerbic and 
derogatory commentary when he defined Hardy's first major success as a sorry and 'curious 
imitation of something better',' that is, of a work of Eliot's. 
That Hardy was familiar with the work of such an established literary authority as Eliot is cer-
tain, though his references to her are few and far between. That he was conscious of the influ-
ence she exerted upon his own ideas is more questionable. One thing, however, needs to be 
emphasized: in no way did Hardy wish to emulate Eliot and actively assumed a position in 
direct opposition to the realistic creed that both she and James championed. Yet there are two 
episodes in Far from the Madding Crowd which possess a remarkable correspondence to two 
Eliotean equivalents, while at the same time maintaining their own individuality and integri-
ty. The first is the similarity between Bathsheba's self-adoration in her hand-mirror and Hetty's 
own ritualized narcissism, also focusing on a hand-mirror, in Adam Bede (1859). The second 
is the resemblance between the awful retinal scorching undergone by Boldwood subsequent to 
his reception of the valentine and that experienced by Dorothea during her honeymoon in 
Middlemarch (1872). In each instance a profound moral thesis is at work that may, for both 
artists, discover its origin in a thinker whose theories were admired by both. Ruskin's 'moral 
retina, by which, and on which, our informing thoughts are concentrated and represented',3 
provides the common focus, though Hardy and Eliot responded to this concept in different 
ways. 
The movement towards a moral theory of perception was best demonstrated by the response 
Ruskin's Modern Painters elicited, the early volumes of 1843 (I) and 1846 (I1) in particular 
exerting a formative influence on current realistic ideology. Eliot's positive critique of volume 
Ill, which appeared in the Westminster Review in 1856,. generated such a radical reformation 
of her thoughts that it precluded a repetition of the uncompromising programmatic realism fol-
lowed in Scenes of Clerical Life. What Eliot found particularly attractive was Ruskin's con-
tention that before the truth could be looked into, mirror-like, nature had to be studied close-
ly; there could be no recourse to simple, unmediated reproduction. He demanded an 'earnest 
mental study ... which [could] interpret all that is written upon ... and within' (Works, IV, 187) 
the scrutinized object, and his insistence on the immanence of the ideal within the real point-
ed the way to reproducing the observed, substantial fact while simultaneously investing it with 
moral depth. 
49 
Ruskin's Idealism became the Realism of the later Victorian novelists, and his vindication of 
imaginative perception drew the attention of Hardy who familiarized himself with Modern 
Painters as early as 1862. Though he was attracted to Ruskin's opinions on perception, and 
idealism in fiction and painting throughout his career, it was only from the mid 1880s that 
Hardy began the formal recording of his findings. The similarity between Ruskin's ideology, 
as it appears in Modern Painters, and Hardy's, as it is set out in his notes and novels, is close 
enough to suggest direct influence. Such citations reveal that what reigned supreme for both 
was the subjective reinterpretation of the objective as it passed through the crucibles of the 
'imagination penetrative' (Works, IV, 250). This faculty, one facet of the 'moral retina', 'never 
stops at crusts ... or outward images' (ibid.), and scorns the shackles of 'mere external fact that 
stand in the way of its suggestiveness' (Works, IV, 278). It is at this point that Ruskin comes 
closest to Hardy, and moves furthest away from Eliot. What underpins Eliot's literary aesthet-
ic, but neither Hardy's nor Ruskin's, is a deference before the substantial components of the 
external world, and an uncompromising loyalty to 'the religion which keeps an open ear and 
an obedient mind to the teachings of fact' .5 
In Adam Bede, Eliot makes her inaugural use of the mirror metaphor that became a common-
place in contemporary discussions on realistic fiction. The potential moral significance of this 
reflective medium was considerable, and its users were obliged to employ it in an edifying, 
instructional capacity; Eliot was undoubtedly at home in this respect. It is in the famous inter-
lude of Chapter 17 that Eliot interrupts the flow of the narrative to explain the formal function 
of the mirror; this episode provides her with the perfect opportunity to deliver a figurative 
exposition of her literary aesthetic: 
I aspire to give no more than a faithful account of men and things as they have 
mirrored themselves in my mind. The mirror is doubtless defective, the out-
lines will sometimes be disturbed; the reflection faint or confused" 
Such a passage identifies this distorting factor as the egoism which is solely concerned with 
Self' - 'my mind' - and which places and glorifies the self as the absolute centre of the (not a) 
universe. In this respect, both Hetty and Bathsheba fall foul of Ruskin's 'false taste' which 
is merely that of falseness or inaccuracy in conclusion, not of moral delin-
quency ... It may be known by its demands of pomp, splendour ... and by its 
pride also: for it is ever self-exulting; its eye is always upon itself, and it tests 
all things round it by the way they fit in'. (Works, IV, 60). 
Eliot declares that 'the selfish' need to be awakened to those consciousnesses which are 'apart 
from themselves', and experience 'the raw material of moral sentiment' (E, p. 270). Similarly, 
Ruskin derides the empiricists' tendency to prioritize the role of the perceiver in a spirited 
attack on 'selfishness' and 'egotism' which anticipates the groundwork of Eliot's own realis-
tic creed of sympathetic observation: for the philosopher, 'nothing ... exists but what he sees 
or thinks it' (Works, V, 202). Like Eliot, Ruskin forwards a persuasive case for the autonomy 
of material things, and challenges the assumption that seeks to dissolve phenomenal reality 
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through imaginative art. And both support the necessity of 'moral emotion': 'those who have 
keenest sympathy are those who look closest and pierce deepest ... Mental sight becomes 
sharper with every full beat of the heart' and is destroyed by 'egotism, and selfish care' (Works, 
IV, 257, 287). Thus the mirror comes to 'reflect' the moral standpoint assumed in each novel: 
egoism invariably degrades individuality, exerts an adverse effect on relationships, and per-
verts the facts of objective reality. Such narcissistic introspection is perceived as a serious state 
of 'moral stupidity'.8 
But this is to anticipate. The episode with Retty takes place two chapters before this authorial 
intrusion, and only with hindsight can we appreciate fully the inevitable deficiency of a 
morally-orientated mode of perception. It is telling enough that Retty's bedroom is dominated 
by this symbol of egocentricity: 
A queer old looking-glass! ... it had a great deal of tarnished gilding about 
it; ... above all, it had a brass candle socket on each side .... But Retty object-
ed to it because it had numerous dim blotches sprinkled over the mirror, which 
no rubbing would remove. (AB, Ch. 15). 
Both subjective and objective mirrors, it seems, are 'doubtless defective' (AB, Ch. 17) and 
prone to imperfection, but such material inconveniences do not dissuade 'devout worshippers 
. .. from performing their religious rites'. That Retty feels constrained to practice her art 
'secretly' demonstrates at least a marginal degree of moral discomfort; she intuitively senses 
that her self-reflexive proclivities are not quite right, and, supported by the narrator's incisive 
assessment, she would 'die with shame' were her self-indulgent tendencies discovered. Yet it 
is also made clear that Retty's essential character inexorably governs her actions and attitudes. 
She cannot help but treasure these artefacts, particularly 'a small red-framed looking-glass, 
without blotches' which is locked out of sight in a lower drawer ofthe altar-like dressing-table. 
'It was into this small glass that she chose to look first after seating herself. She looked into it, 
smiling' (AB, Ch. 15). And, as with Narcissus, that 'look' seals her fate. It is in this diminutive 
replica of its larger counterpart that Retty chooses to practise her mimetic pretensions. Rer 
desire to 'look like the picture' she has seen, to reproduce art by holding nature before the dis-
torting and defective mirror, is understood as a destructive, not a creative, process. Yet she is 
granted success: 'Even the old mottled glass couldn't help sending back a lovely image.' And, 
as with the case of Bathsheba, the result produced by the contrived coalition of art and nature 
is a living picture of profound moral import deserving of the title 'Vanity'. 
The process of artificial reproduction is not straightforward and involves the presence of an 
active observer. Though Eliot's conception of reality as existing a priori, as anterior to the nar-
rative, is made clear, there is still a Berkeleyan suggestion that esse est percipi, to be is to be 
perceived. Yet, for the most part, Eliot imitates Ruskin's endeavour to persuade us out of a 
belief in a closed world of sense impressions, and, like him, is concerned with preserving the 
autonomous quality of external actualities; objects are allowed their own ontological signifi-
cance, independent of a perceiving consciousness. For both Ruskin and Eliot, violent emotions 
'produce in us a falseness in all our impressions of external things' (Works, V, 205), and, for 
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Eliot, 'falsity' (AB, Ch. 17) is the ultimate dread. But a perceptual and formal ambivalence 
remains. Hetty receives not only the direct scrutiny of the narrator and the imaginative partic-
ipation of the reader; above all, she perceives, and thus creates, herself. She, like Bathsheba, 
desires herself and is, first and foremost, the object of her own approval. If Hetty were a 
Hardyan heroine and was herself her only audience, the fleeting image reflected in the glass 
would cease to exist the moment she turned from it. But for Eliot, things and people are first 
and seen second. Nevertheless, a witness is always insinuated. And, in addition to Hetty, Eliot 
and the reader there is the recollection of the appreciative, constructive masculine gaze belong-
ing to 'an invisible spectator whose eyes rested on her like morning on the flowers', the 
Captain's. This appears in anticipation of Hardy's more contiguous and physically real onlook-
er, but Donnithorne is only conjured up by a suggestive imagination; and, in the last instance, 
it is not directly through his eyes that Hetty is defined and determined. That task is shared 
through the optical co-operation of reader and authorial guide. For Bathsheba, on the other 
hand, the construction is monopolized by two voyeuristic men, a technique which inevitably 
generates its own drawbacks: the distance and reticence adopted by Hardy precludes full 
access to Bathsheba's thoughts and motives; only biased speculation is offered. With Hetty, 
authorial exposition is thorough; Hardy simply chooses to show at this juncture, and ambiva-
lence is a natural consequence. 
Yet Eliot's almost fascinated and meticulous attention to physical detail does not imply that 
she condones her heroine's actions. Eliot censures and abjures Hetty for her selfishness, and 
critices the insufficiency of the defective, 'dim ill-defined pictures that her narrow bit of imag-
ination can make' (AB, Ch. 15). Moreover, the reprimand is optically prescribed and Eliot 
examines the deceptive discrepancy operating between appearance and reality, between things 
as they are (concrete facts) and the interpretations of their meaning (abstract ideas). Eyelashes 
are the objects which excite speculation: 
I fmd it impossible not to expect some depth of soul behind a deep grey eye 
with a long dark eyelash, in spite of an experience which has shown me that 
they may go along with deceit, peculation, and stupidity .... One begins to sus-
pect ... that there is no direct correlation between eyelashes and morals. (ibid) 
Hetty's principal failing, at least when measured against the ethical code established as the 
novel's perceptual criterion, is her lack of humanistic sympathy. Her 'false taste', which 'tests 
all things round it by the way they fit in' (Works, IV, 60) , means that she looks at and feels 
nothing for her fellow men except as they relate to her, and her preoccupation with Self fore-
shadows the 'moral stupidity' (M, Ch. 21) of Dorothea. And it appears that her lack of com-
passionate perspicacity is inevitable given the nature of what Hardy misogynistically defines 
as 'Woman's prescriptive infirmity' - 'Vanity'" Eliot allows those suffering from these 'moral 
deficiencies' to detect this inherent flaw: 
It is generally a feminine eye that first detects the moral deficiencies hidden 
under the 'dear deceit' of beauty: so it is not surprising that Mrs Poyser, with 
her keenness and abundant opportunity for observation, should have formed a 
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tolerably fair estimate of what might be expected from Hetty in the way of 
feeling. (AB, Ch. 15) 
In Far from the Madding Crowd, the power to recognize this imperfection is wholly mascu-
line, both Hardy and Oak in collaboration assuming the 'keenness and abundant opportunity 
for observation' formerly attributed to Mrs Poyser. 
The famous opening chapter of Far from the Madding Crowd reveals Bathsheba as she is per-
ceived through a gradual telescoping of the perspective: Hardy watches the reader watching 
Oak and the animals watching Bathsheba who abruptly halts the pattern when, contemplating 
herself, she finds in herself a sufficient audience. As with Hetty, she takes precautionary mea-
sures by ensuring that no one is near enough to spy on her premeditated action (the waggoner 
'was not yet in sight'), and proceeds in the same stealthy, tentative, secretive manner. Neither 
woman is able to resist the temptation of satisfying a whim grounded in self-adoration. But 
whereas Hetty confines her display to the privacy of her bedroom, Bathsheba brings the bed-
room outside; whereas Hetty is inspired by a work of art, Bathsheba gives way to a more nat-
ural impulse: 
Her eyes crept back to the package .... At length she drew the article into her 
lap, and untied the paper covering; a small swing looking-glass was disclosed, 
in which she proceeded to survey herself attentively. She parted her lips and 
smiled. (FMC, Ch. 1) 
Both are pleased with what they see; both smile and delight in themselves. But here there is 
no imaginary Donnithorne to stimulate, excite and explain this action, this unmitigated plea-
sure in herself. Bathsheba herself provides an adequate witness and so absorbed is she in her 
reflection that she remains oblivious of the fact that her performance is made before 'the sight 
of sparrows, blackbirds, and unperceived farmer who were alone its spectators' (ibid). 
Another crucial difference between the two episodes, despite superficial similarities, is the 
identification of the artist responsible for the manufacture of each portrait. Hetty consciously 
undertakes the reproduction of 'the picture' herself and, through Eliot's exposition, is held 
fully accountable for what she does. But Bathsheba is denied this control as a definition is 
imposed upon her by the combined and ambiguous thought-processes supply by Hardy and 
Oak, neither of whom can penetrate her fundamental inscrutability. Recognition of this inef-
fable quality may in part account for the ungenial assessment provided by the baffled farmer: 
The picture was a delicate one. Woman's prescriptive infirmity had stalked 
into the sunlight. ... A cynical inference was irresistible by Gabriel Oak as he 
regarded the scene, generous though he fain would have been. There was no 
necessity whatever for her looking in the glass. (ibid) 
What, one wonders, would have made him 'generous'? It is a typical bit of masculine cyni-
cism: this woman is pleasing to herself; she is not looking at her reflection to ensure any man's 
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acknowledgement, or relying on any man's reassurance. Bathsheba has appropriated what is 
in Hardy's novels a male prerogative: definition of the feminine through a penetrating mascu-
line gaze. She has plundered this male preserve and has the audacity to recognize and deter-
mine herself. Oak is unable to accept this (along with Hardy whose own view becomes almost 
inseparable from his protagonist's) and, in an attempt to wrestle back at least a degree of con-
trol, states that he can see nothing wrong with her appearance: only that would account for the 
'necessity' of a mirror. To reinforce these ideas he speculates on the presence of a masculine 
impetus for her actions - those 'likely dramas in which men would play a part'. 
Nevertheless, the 'conjecture' forwarded by Oak is so ambivalent that Bathsheba is left for the 
time being, as an equivocal 'picture', unreadable to all of her observers. Only to herself, it 
seems, is there significance in her movements, and the final summation from the men is that 
'she simply observed herself as a fair product of Nature in the feminine kind'. This is where 
the scene differs most from Hetty's with regard to the position adopted by the omniscient nar-
rator. The sheer indeterminacy of the Hardy vision, in diametric opposition to that of Eliot, 
contObutes to the fundamental complexity and final inscrutability of the perspective; one can-
not decide at this juncture whether the primary point of view is critical, admiring, or neutral. 
But neither the mirror nor Hardy lie, and artifice seems to have the final place here as it does 
with Hetty. And for Bathsheba, the artifice is suggested into existence by Oak's conventional, 
'cynical' evaluation which colours things in an entireiy different way. What is more, it is left 
to the 'piqued' and rebuffed 'spectator' to name these feminine antics by expounding on wom-
ankind's innate, moral 'faults': 'The greatest of them is - well, what it is always ... Vanity'. 
Though Hardy is more doubtful than Eliot as to whether someone inherently infirm can ever 
develop perceptually and grow morally, he does at least show that Bathsheba attains a mod-
icum of true insight as a result of her observational experiences. She matures out of that per-
ceptually debilitating 'false taste' and aspires to the mastery of 'true taste' which 'is forever 
growing, leaming ... and testing itself by the way that it fits things' (Works, N, 60). She comes 
to recognize the moral responsibilities incumbent on one upon whom 'many eyes were turned' 
(FMC, Ch. L); she is able to see that she is a 'watched woman' (FMC, Ch. LI) and act accord-
ingly. Aware now that she is an objective as well as a subjective entity, she painfully works her 
way out of that introspective and self-absorbed 'moral stupidity' which belongs to Dorothea. 
Hetty, on the other hand is morally and perceptually irredeemable and spirals further inward 
until she is finally lost to all objective scrutiny, literally and figuratively, as she is transported 
out of the novel. Once she leaves the narrative, she exists only where she always wished: in 
her own mind. 
This moral theory of perception has a profound effect on the physical and mental eyes them-
selves. As both authors demonstrate, the latter are extremely sensitive and impressionable to 
information brought in by the former, especially when a moral dilemma is involved. 
Depending on the intensity of the situation, the retina is irreversibly engraved. Once this 
scorching had taken place, the impression becomes the experience and the associative process 
gains in potency with the passage of time. Perhaps the most startling 'moment of vision' in Far 
from the Madding Crowd is that exploring Boldwood's response to the massive suggestiveness 
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of this retinal branding. His reaction is of an intensity so appalling that the incident degener-
ates into an obsessive perceptual fixation y literally and figuratively. Bathsheba irrevocably 
stamps his inner eye; she controls and occupies its functions; she forces herself into his mind 
so thoroughly and monopolizes the attention and focus of his physical eye so absolutely that 
there is little room left fOl'-anything else. Clear sight is impossible. For her, this monopoliza-
tion of Boldwood's visual faculties is a just reparation for the perplexity caused by his refusal 
to 'afford her the official look of admiration' by 'withhold[ing] his eyes' (FMC, Ch. XIII). This 
riveting, optical dichotomy of possessing and being possessed is a consequence of her retali-
ation, and she decides to fight sight with sight. Her impulsive gesture allows her to material-
ize and concentrate those numerous living signifiers of moral discomfort and unease to which 
she is prone: blushes. The telling 'enlarging spot' (FMC, Ch. IV) frequently suffuses her face 
and is called forth at her first sight of herself in the looking-glass: 'She blushed at herself, and 
seeing her reflection blush, blushed the more' (FMC, Ch. I). These bloody circles are trans-
formed into the branding iron, the famous wax circle on the card: 'Here the bachelor's gaze 
was continually fastening itself till the large red seal became as a blot of blood on the retina of 
his eye' (FMC, Ch. XIV).IO 
Sasakill suggests that one of Eliot's own moments of vision, that pertaining to Dorothea's dis-
satisfaction with her honey-moon, ingrained itself into Hardy's own inner eye: 'In certain 
states of dull forlornness Dorothea all her life continued to see the red drapery ... spreading 
itself everywhere like a disease of the retina' (M, Ch. 20). For all of the victims of this indeli-
ble marking the episodes reveal their ultimate significance in retrospect; it takes time for the 
associative process - in which objects are assigned an emotional equivalent through habit or 
familiarity - to gather in force and meaning: 
Forms both pale and glowing took possession of her young sense, and fixed 
themselves in her memory even when she was not thinking of them, preparing 
strange associations which remained through her after years. (M, Ch. 20) 
Though there are undeniable similarities, the differences are substantial. From a contextual 
point of view, Dorothea's isolation from known and customary phenomena is physical as well 
as mental, whereas Boldwood experiences only subjective displacement. Dorothea is sur-
rounded by impressive but distanced images which, from an objective standpoint, possess no 
personal significance until she projects her emotions outward and the Self of the imaginative 
realm begins to distort the Other world of fact. The formal 'stupendous fragmentariness' con-
comitant with such a process, a condition which permeates the whole experience, is only just 
held back from total disintegration by the masterly skills of the omnicompetent narrator. Hardy 
is neither as controlled nor as successful in preventing such formal incongruities 
One of Eliot's characteristics is to accommodate extreme objective and subjective perspectives 
within a single vision. This passage traces the progressive shift from the abstract to its exter-
nal correlative in the concrete, and its final return to the inner mood and vision. Yet despite 
this perceptual oscillation and the narrator's intense sympathy, there is no relinquishing of 
calm objectivity. Hardy's movements between internal and external views are similarly flexi-
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ble, as is his assimilation of exhibition and exposition, and it is also through the intercession 
of an overly-stimulated imagination that the material object is transformed into a symbolic 
subjective presence. But whereas Eliot's combination of the showing and the telling amounts 
to almost perfect formal coherence, Hardy's technique balances precariously on the edge of 
dissonance, and he offsets the poetical translation by explaining it through an incongruous and 
incompatible scientific analogy. The cold precision which seeks to equate impressionable 
'crystal substances' with the enormous emotional energy contained in the 'blot of blood' is an 
awkward intrusion which threatens to undermine the autonomy of the experience. The incon-
gruity is only partially mitigated by its existence as an attempt to justify, with only marginal 
success, the correspondence of the general and the particular. Eliot is more likely to interpo-
late than Hardy and is certainly less disruptive when she does so; Hardy is more persuasive 
when he chooses to show and permits the episode to express itself. The repetition of red on 
white is more psychologically convincing when conceived as a subjective projection emanat-
ing directly from behind Boldwood's affected eyes: 'the only half of the sun yet visible burnt 
rayless, like a red flameless fire showing over a white hearthstone' (FMC, Ch. XIV).12 
Dorothea, like Boldwood, has 'no ... defence against deep impressions' (M, Ch. 20), but the 
principal distinguishing feature resides in the authors' attitudes to the function of the 'moral 
retina'. Dorothea is watched in the process of battling to extricate herself from the 'moral stu-
pidity' (M, Ch. 21) which encourages her to project her egocentric desires onto the outer world, 
and she is thoroughly crushed when the 'incongruities' become all too clear. For Eliot, the role 
of the 'moral retina' is to teach the absolute and independent value of the objective Other while 
also guiding the perceiver into acknowledging the difference as well as the equivalence of 
those 'centres of self' within other consciousnesses. Dorothea receives due punishment for her 
wilful and selfish perversion of 'fact', for her inclination disturbs the integrity of the real world 
until it approximates an 'illusion of exaggerated sensitiveness' (M, Ch. 20). Given the pre-
scriptions operating within Eliot's aesthetic, Dorothea's 'mental life' demands immediate 
'readjustment' (ibid). Hardy's doctrine, on the other hand, advocates the opposite. His creed, 
depending for its significance on the visually-orientated process of subjective/affective asso-
ciation, is not concerned with eradicating this idiosyncratic mode of regard so much as simul-
taneously encouraging and tempering its development, thereby bringing it into accord with the 
moral parameters established by that particular narrative. 
And to infer a connection between the mirror and the retina is neither arbitrary nor tenuous. In 
each case the looking-glass is shaped like an eye, and matches its perceiver's intensity of gaze. 
Moreover, the colour red is conspicuous in all instances. Hetty's small mirror itself is red-
framed; Bathsheba's red jacket is matched by the blush which incamadines her reflected face 
as she surveys herself; Boldwood's 'blot of blood' and Dorothea's blood-red retina are addi-
tional scarlet circles inextricably linked with looking. In addition, each character is irresistibly 
attracted by this colour whether it be on cheeks, mirrors, cards or curtains; the eye of the ego-
centric seems to exhibit a pronounced susceptibility for this hue. Indeed, all of the characters 
are self-absorbed, observing the people and the world around them (when they surface from 
their own minds, that is) with their inner rather than their physical eyes. Each narrative shows 
these egos attempting to come to terms with the Not-I. Only Dorothea can claim any real suc-
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cess and manages to liberate herself from herself. 'Full souls are double mirrors' (M, Ch. 72), 
an observation which crystallises the moral and perceptual position which Dorothea, having 
experienced the single-mirror of Casaubon, finally attains. Hetty and Bathsheba bring an eye 
moulded from and surfeited with T and that is all they see, and Bathsheba is left only slight-
ly better off than her Eliotean partner, dependent in the end on Oak's visually-charged prophe-
cy: 'Whenever you look up, there I shall be - and whenever I look up, there will be you' (FMC, 
Ch. 4). He, and only he, will be her mirror from now on. Hetty breaks free of such a mascu-
line-dominated visual prison but the alternative is just as annihilative of the Self: she is lost to 
everyone's sight and is reduced to a subjective impression stored in the memory of all who 
knew her. For men, it seems, madness is the only possible result and Boldwood's optical 
obsession destroys his sanity. Perhaps, therefore, one can look not only to Ruskin for a com-
mon source of inspiration but to Carlyle, who was esteemed by both Hardy and Eliot. In the 
final analysis, then, 'the eye sees that which it brings with it the means of seeing' .13 And that 
'means' is I. 
Notes 
1. Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. Mary Innes (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955), Bk Ill, 
p.85. 
2. H. James, 'Far from the Madding Crowd', Nation, 24 (Dec, 1874); rpt. Thomas Hardy: 
Critical Assessments, ed. Graham Clarke, 4 vols (Sussex: Helm Information, 1993), 
pp. 183-7 (I, 187). 
3. J. Ruskin, The Works of John Ruskin, ed. E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, 39 
vols (London: George Allen, 1903-12), IV, 36. Hereafter cited as Works. 
4. G. Eliot, 'Art and Belles Lettres', Westminster Review, 65 (April 1856), 626-7. 
5. The Essays of George Eliot, ed. Thomas Pinney (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1963), p. 429. Hereafter cited as E. 
6 Adam Bede, ed. Stephen Gill (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), Ch. 17. Hereafter 
shortened to AB. 
7 See Richard Freadman, Eliot, James and the Fictional Self: A Study in Character and 
Narration (London: MacMillan, 1986) esp. pp. 10-16. 
8 Middlemarch, ed. W. J. Harvey (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), Ch. 21. Hereafter 
cited as M. 
9 Far from the Madding Crowd, Ch. I, ed. Ronald Blythe (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1975). Hereafter shortened to FMC. 
57 
10. For further analysis of the passage see Ian Gregor, The Great Web: The Form of 
Hardy's Major Fiction (London: Faber & Faber, 1974), p. 54; Jean Brooks, Thomas 
Hardy: The Poetic Structure (New York: Comell University Press, 1971), p. 71. 
11. Torn Sasaki, 'On Boldwood's Retina: A "Moment of Vision" in Far from the Madding 
Crowd and its Possible Relation to Middlemarch', Thomas Hardy Journal, VIII:3 (Oct 
1992), 57-60. 
12. Cp. 'A letter lies on the red velvet cover of the table; staring up by reason of the con-
trast. I cover it over, that it may not hit my eyes so hard'. F. E. Hardy, The Early Life 
of Thomas Hardy, 1840-1891 (London: MacMillan, 1928), p. 276. 
13. Last line of 'The Profitable Reading of Fiction' (1888), in Hardy's Personal Writings, 
ed. Harold Orel (London: MacMillan, 1967; rpt. 1990), pp. 110-125 (p. 125). 
Quotation from Thomas Carlyle, The French Revolution, Part One, Bk I, Ch II, 
'Realised Ideals'; also in Past and Present, Book IV, Ch I, 'Aristocracies': '''in every 
object there is inexhaustible meaning; the eye sees in it what the eye brings means of 
seeing'" . 
58 
